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EPISTEMIC ANALYSIS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF
GOOD INFORMANTS
JAMES MACBAIN
Kansas State University

Abstract
Edward Craig has proposed that epistemology should eschew traditional
conceptual analysis in favor of what he calls “conceptual synthesis.” He
proposes we start not from the finding of necessary and sufficient conditions
that match our intuitions; rather we start from considerations on what the
concept of knowledge does for us. In this paper I will explore one aspect of
Craig’s proposal – the good informant. It is this aspect that is central to
Craig’s epistemic method and perhaps most problematic. I will evaluate this
concept by first articulating three initial worries that some have had about
the concept and then show how each of the initial worries can be quelled by
looking deeper into the features of what Craig’s proposal is. I then assess
Craig’s proposal on its own terms by looking at the concept of a good informant in light of the criteria for an adequate explication. What I will show is
that while there is much to be sympathetic with in Craig’s proposal, there
are some open questions that need to be solved in order to say that an adequate explication has been reached.

The question as to the appropriate method of epistemic analysis has
always been an issue for epistemologists. In recent years, the traditional method utilized in epistemology – conceptual analysis – has
come under attack from various perspectives. Yet, often no replacement method is given in its place. In two works, “A Practical Explication of Knowledge” and Knowledge and the State of Nature, Edward
Craig proposes a new way of doing epistemology. Craig’s epistemic
method eschews traditional conceptual analysis in favor of what he
calls “conceptual synthesis.” He proposes we start not from the finding
of necessary and sufficient conditions that match our intuitions; rather
© Principia 8 (2) 2004, pp. 193–211. Published by NEL – Epistemology and Logic
Research Group, Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC), Brazil.
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we start from considerations on what the concept of knowledge does
for us. Though there is much to discuss in Craig’s proposal, in this paper I will explore one aspect – the good informant. It is this aspect that
is central to Craig’s epistemic method and perhaps most problematic.
In what follows, I will evaluate this concept by first articulating three
initial worries that some have had about the proposal. I will then show
that each of the initial worries can be quelled by looking deeper into
the features of what Craig’s proposal is. I will then assess Craig’s proposal on its own terms. Instead of looking to counterexamples for possible problems, I will look at the concept of a good informant in light
of the criteria for an adequate explication. What I hope to show is that
while there is much to be sympathetic with in Craig’s proposal, there
are some open questions that need to be solved in order to say that an
adequate explication has been reached.

1. Conceptual Synthesis and the Role of Good Informants
Instead of the traditional conceptual analysis on the concept of knowledge, Craig proposes to approach epistemology by investigating the
value of knowledge, i.e., what the concept of knowledge does for us.1
He asks us to consider what role knowledge plays in our lives, and
then consider what a concept having such a role might be like and
what the conditions that would govern the application of such a concept are (Craig 1990, p. 2). His methodology is that of explication. For
Craig, to explicate a concept is to “construct a new version of it satisfying certain standards, with the proviso that to count as a new version
of that concept it had to emerge with many of its principal features
intact” (1990, p. 8). His method is similar to Rudolf Carnap’s rational
reconstruction although on a practical, rather than a theoretical, level.
It is practical in that it is an explication of a concept that is supposed
to help the survival of epistemic agents in communities. Thus, Craig’s
proposal is different than traditional epistemic analysis in three ways:
first, the proposal changes the order of the inquiry and take the characterization of the value of knowledge first and then assesses how well
our intuitions fit with that explication; second, it maintains that all
Principia 8 (2), Florianópolis, December 2004, pp. 193–211.

Epistemic Analysis and the Possibility of Good Informants

195

features of the explication come from the value of the concept of
knowledge; and third, we explicate the concept only by evaluating
what value the concept of knowledge, not knowledge itself, has to
human life (Schmitt 1992, p. 555).
So what does the concept of knowledge do for us? Craig maintains
that the concept of knowledge “is used to flag approved sources of information” (1990, p. 11). As he states, humans need true beliefs about
their environment that can serve as a guide to successful actions;
hence, they need sources of information that will yield true beliefs
(1990, p. 11). Humans do have “onboard” perceptual sources of information, but they also need to acquire information from those
around them if they are to survive. So, humans need ways of evaluating these sources of information and the concepts that are in use with
such sources.
This is where the notion of the informant comes into play. Whenever one is in the position of seeking information on whether p is or is
not the case, she first wants an informant who will tell the truth about
p. Yet, in order to survive, we not only want informants, but rather
good informants. A good informant is an agent who believes p and p is
the case, and has some detectable property that correlates her being
right about p (1990, p. 18). So, in order to be a good informant, one
must believe p, p must be true, and she must have some property the
inquirer can detect to inform her that she is to be trusted. Furthermore, we will want a way in which to distinguish good informants from
not-good informants.
There is a further interesting dimension to Craig’s notion of an informant. There is an ethical dimension at work here as well as an epistemic one. An informant is a “co-operating member of our species”
(1990, p. 36). An informant is someone who can empathize with our
situation. That is, she cannot just provide the information, but also
understand why it is that we want or need the information. This distinguishes an informant from a mere source of information. Mere
sources of information cannot exhibit this essentially human element.
They cannot “know what the inquirer is up to” (1990, p. 36). It is this
feature that illustrates the situation we are in – epistemic agents who
treat each others as subjects with the common purpose of obtaining
Principia 8 (2), Florianópolis, December 2004, pp. 193–211.
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true beliefs and not as mere sources of information from which true
beliefs will be extracted (1990, p. 36).
Craig recognizes that one may object to his proposal on the grounds
that agents can know even when they are unwilling to tell what they
know and agents also can know even when inquirers cannot detect
any property that correlates the agent with having a true belief. It is
here that Craig introduces the “objectivising” of the concept of a good
informant. The principle of objectivisation states that agents start from
simple, self-interested concepts and progress from these to more and
more general, “objective” concepts. Our concept of a knower is the
objectivised concept of a good informant. A good informant is one
that is in my interest to find. She supposedly would have information
for me, has information that is in my concern, will be able to communicate with me, and is accessible to me (1990, p. 85). Yet, such a concept will not serve a community’s needs. A community will objectivise
the concept. That is, we will subtract what is relevant to me at a particular time. Once we objectivise the concept of a good informant, we
are left with the true belief requirement and the requirement of having
a property correlating well with true belief on the issue in question, but
the requirement of having a detectable property will be “diluted”
(1990, p. 90). This diluting results in our ability to recommend good
informants to others who detect in ways different than our own. So, I
can recommend informants to others that they might not normally
detect and others can recommend informants to me that I cannot detect. So a good informant need not have a property that I can detect
as long she has a property that someone can detect.
The bottom line of Craig’s proposal is that an agent who is a good
informant is a good informant whatever circumstances the inquirer is
in and whatever attitudes the inquirer has towards the matter (1990,
p. 91). Thus, a good informant is an agent that has a very high degree
of possessing a true belief. This high degree must be for all, not just for
one person in particular circumstances. And the more we objectivise
the concept; we get closer to the concept of knowledge.

Principia 8 (2), Florianópolis, December 2004, pp. 193–211.
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2. Some Initial Worries about Good Informants
While the addition of good informants is supposed to, in part, salvage
epistemic analysis from the traditional problems facing the standard
practice of finding necessary and sufficient conditions, it does raise
some immediate questions. In this section I will articulate three worries some have had.2 First, how and when should we check others’
powers of detection? That is, how do we know that the others we are
trusting do not have worse powers than we do and hence should not
trust them? Second, what good is objectivising the concept of a good
informant to that of a knower if the informant won’t talk to anyone?
And third, if we raise the requirements of a good informant to being
“very likely to be right,” then such an account will not serve our everyday purposes.

2.1. First Worry – Problem of Worse Detectors
According to Craig’s process of objectivisation, we take the primitive
concept of a good informant and objectivise it to the point to where it
is no longer a matter of a person who would inform just myself about
whether p. This is the move toward that of a knower. We are supposed
to reach a point where we can no longer worry about recognizing good
informants and we can trust others since they may have greater powers
of detection. Yet, what of those that have worse powers of detection
(Dancy 1992, p. 395)? The problem here is that Craig maintains the
recognizability requirement will be diluted once we have objectivised
the concept. Yet, once this requirement is diluted, we can fall victim
to trusting those who have very weak powers of detection.
This leads to one of two possible results. First, there should be no
diluting of the concept. We need in place a way in which to check the
powers of the detectors. We need a way in which to determine those
who have strong powers. Or, second, the recognizability requirement
was never a part of the concept of a knower in the first place (Dancy
1992, p. 395). That is, when we want to determine whether p is the
case we want someone who we can recognize as knowing whether p,
but that is not to say that being a recognizable knower is part of the
Principia 8 (2), Florianópolis, December 2004, pp. 193–211.
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concept of knower. Dancy illustrates this point with an analogy; “when
we are looking for someone to heal us, we obviously want someone we
can recognize as such, but the concept of being a recognizable healer is
not part of the concept of a doctor” (p. 395). Either option weakens
Craig’s proposal considerably.

2.2. Second Worry – Problem of the Closed-Mouth
Informant
It is important to note that objectivisation does not only apply to an
agent finding a good informant, but it also applies to group action.
When epistemic agents are in groups, they have a considerable interest
in finding partners who have true beliefs about whether p is the case.
Furthermore, this interest does not go away even in situations where
the others in the group are unable or unwilling to convey information.
This is central to Craig’s proposal. Yet, if it is possible to have a
knower who will not convey any information to the group, then it
would seem that the concept of a good informant is irrelevant to that
of a knower. In other words, if it is possible to have a knower who
won’t talk to anyone, then it is possible to have a concept of a knower
without it being the result of the objectivisation of the primitive concept of a good informant (Feldman 1997, p. 211). So, it would seem
that the concept of a good informant does not have a role in the concept of a knower.

2.3. Third Worry – High Standards and Our Everyday
Epistemic Purposes
According to Craig, we never know how much importance getting the
correct information has and so the standards for being a knower are
going to be very high. That is, to be a knower, one must meet very
demanding standards since we do not know the risks and/or benefits of
the information. As Craig states:

Principia 8 (2), Florianópolis, December 2004, pp. 193–211.
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In saying that someone knows whether p we are certifying him as an
informant on that question, and we have no idea of the practical
needs of the many people who may want to take him up on it; hence
a practice develops of setting the standard very high, so that whatever
turns, for them, on getting the truth about p, we need not fear reproach if they follow our recommendation. (1990, p. 94).

So, due to the value that having true beliefs has for us, our objectivised concept of a knower will result in having very high epistemic
standards.
The problem here comes from a tension between the high standards that have been placed and the desire for the proposal to be applicable to our everyday lives. That is, by setting the standards high,
we set them too high to please everyone (Feldman 1997, p. 211). Suppose that someone asks me for the best place to get coffee. Now, I restrict myself to informing the person of informants who are only very
likely to be right. It may (and probably will) be the case that I will fail
to recommend anyone to the person. This would surely fail to satisfy
many people in everyday circumstances since there would be many
people who are more than able to be good informants on the question
of the best coffee even if they are agents who are only, say, merely
likely to be right (Feldman 1977, p. 211). So, this objectivised concept
will not serve our purposes in everyday life. We normally do not seek
out informants who are “very likely to be right” on everyday, trivial
matters (though what counts as everyday and trivial will be highly subjective). So, Craig’s proposal fails to do exactly what he hoped for at
the outset, to give us a practical explication. The demands he sets are
just too high.

3. Responding to the Initial Worries
In this section I will attempt to offer some responses to each of the
initial worries articulated above. Overall, I take it that once we look at
Craig’s proposal from a broader perspective we see that many of the
initial worries dissolve.

Principia 8 (2), Florianópolis, December 2004, pp. 193–211.
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3.1. Responding to the First Worry
In responding to the first worry it is important to remember an initial
feature of Craig’s proposal – it is a practical explication. The remembrance that it is a practical explication is important due to it not being
problematic that there is a counterexample. Just because we sometimes fall victim to someone with worse powers of detection than ourselves does not immediately pose a problem for the proposal. That is,
since we have eschewed the method of providing necessary and sufficient conditions in favor of merely attempting to provide a new version of the concept with as many of the practical principal features
intact, the finding of a counterexample does not initially pose a problem (Craig 1986–7, p. 214).
Yet one may respond that this is not merely a counterexample. If it
is common that we encounter one who has worse powers of detection
than ourselves, then the practical explication itself is in trouble since
the concept is not very useful to us in our everyday lives. That is, we
will have to up the recognizability requirement or drop it in order for it
to be practical. I believe that Craig can accept the first horn of the
dilemma without problem. According to Craig, there is a way of determining the powers of detectors. The way this is initially done is by
the recommendation of others. By saying that someone knows that p,
we are certifying their status as an informant (1990, p. 94). This status
as an informant is a status for everyone. In other words, the standard
being set is very high. Such a high standard allows us to not worry
about the possibility of finding someone with weak powers of detection. If someone recommends another as an informant, then she is certifying that informant as one who meets the high standards for anyone’s practical needs. That is, whatever anyone’s needs, the recommendation of another as an informant certifies the person as someone
who can give us the truth about p. It is in this way that the recognizability requirement is part of the concept of a knower. Hence, I do not
see that Craig is necessarily plagued by this problem.

Principia 8 (2), Florianópolis, December 2004, pp. 193–211.
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3.2. Responding to the Second Worry
The problem of the closed-mouth informant turns on the possibility of
having a knower who will not tell anyone what it is they know. If it is
possible to have such a person, then the concept of a good informant is
irrelevant to that of a knower. Yet, Craig has a response to such an
example. According to Craig, it may not be the case that the informant wants or is willing to tell me what she knows, but she may be
willing to tell someone else. The information can travel through the
“pipeline” to get to me (hopefully) eventually (1990, p. 93). That is,
the purpose of the information will eventually be satisfied via the
transferal of information, even if my purposes for having the information are not satisfied. It is this that objectivisation is supposed to provide. Objectivisation is intended to provide a “satisfying… explanation
of how and why such a concept comes to be formed” (1990, p. 93).
Now this may seem unsatisfying to some. What of the closedmouth informant who just does not tell me, but does not tell anyone?
In such a case, the group action or group purpose of the information
fails to be satisfied. But this still fails to falsify the proposal on the table. In someone being recommended to us as an informant, they are
merely being certified as a knower. If the knower does not convey the
information to us, then it is not the case that they would not be a good
informant or that they the recommender’s powers of detection are
weak. All that is being said is that the channels of communication are
not open. This is not initially problematic for Craig. Craig maintains
that channels of communication should be open, not that they are
open. It is the case with the closed-mouth informant that the information should be conveyed, it is just that it is not. This does not show
that the concept of a good informant is not part of being a knower. It
shows that there is a normative dimension to the conveying of information (and one that Craig invokes in his proposal). It is the case that
I am seeking one who should convey information, but to say that she
won’t “spill the beans” does not entail that being a good informant is
not part of being a knower. Thus, while such cases may (and probably
do) exist, they do not pose a problem to Craig’s analysis of the concept
of a knower.
Principia 8 (2), Florianópolis, December 2004, pp. 193–211.
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3.3. Responding to the Third Worry
The problem of high standards and our everyday epistemic practice
stems from Craig’s demand that when we recommend an informant,
we are to recommend one that we can certify is very likely to be right.
This is supposed to put us in the position of not being able to recommend informants in everyday inquisitions since the standard is too
high. That is, the objectivised concept will not suit our everyday epistemic purposes since everyday epistemic situations are such that we,
more often than not, cannot recommend anyone who meets the certitude standard. The problem with this worry is that it takes Craig’s proposal to dictate that we must recommend only those informants that
are “very likely to be right.” This is not what Craig is proposing. Craig’s
proposal maintains that a practice will develop by which we will have
high standards for informants. I believe, contra Feldman, that we do in
fact seek out informants who will be very likely to be right. The worry
trades on the moving from our seeking out such an informant and the
recommender being able to recommend someone who fits this standard. It may be the case that the recommender cannot recommend
anyone since she does not know anyone who has the information that
we need. It is not the case that neither the recommender nor I have
impractically high standards, it is that there is no one, to the recommender’s knowledge, who can fulfill the standards we have at the time.
Everyday situations would seem to coincide with Craig’s proposal
without much difficulty.

3.4. A Final Point about the Initial Worries
I believe that many of the above worries stem from a problem concerning the type of epistemic analysis that Craig is proposing. Craig’s proposal is meant to be a practical explication and not a conceptual
analysis. Craig intentionally eschews the possibility of his proposal falling victim to various counterexamples. The reason Craig gives for rePrincipia 8 (2), Florianópolis, December 2004, pp. 193–211.
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jecting conceptual analysis is that ‘knows’ is not susceptible to analysis.
He claims that any strict definition will fall victim to counterexamples
where the link between truth and justification breaks down. As he
states:
[T]here is not going to be any X that absolutely has to be regarded as
conferring high probability on S’s being right about p no matter what
else we know about S and his circumstances; there will always be
something else we could come to believe which would bring us significantly to lower our estimate; so examples will always be available to
show that a proposed analysis does not offer sufficient conditions
(1986–7, p. 226).

In light of this, Craig proposes that we eschew traditional analysis
and try an alternative approach.
It is worth noting that Craig does not offer a substantial argument
on why conceptual analysis fails. He offers two comments about the
traditional methodology failure. First, for any proposed analysis, the
skeptic attempts to argue that our intuitions about the intension of the
concept determine a smaller extension that our everyday intuitions
about the extension (1990, p. 1). Now, if the skeptic is correct, we
have a question as to which set of intuitions should give priority in
determining the correct folk concept. If the skeptic is incorrect, then
we need an argument as to why the skeptical worry is in fact nonproblematic. What this points out, according to Craig, is that a considerable amount of epistemological work needs to be done to just to
say that there is such a folk concept at all and address what is the appropriate methodology to address any such questions (1990, p. 1).
Second, even if we suppose that we have an analysis that captures our
folk concept fully, the question still looms as to why has a concept
which fits the conditions proposed in the correct analysis had such
widespread use (1990, p. 2). This question leads us to the follow point:
There seems to be no known language in which sentences using
‘know’ do not find a comfortable and colloquial equivalent. The implication is that it answers to some very general needs of human life
and thought, and it would surely be interesting to know which and
how (1990, p. 2).
Principia 8 (2), Florianópolis, December 2004, pp. 193–211.
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The worry here is that more complex the analysis to the concept,
the harder it will become to answer these questions.
Craig treats such concerns as problematic to the point where we
should move off into a different direction – a practical explication.
This move is what dissolves many of the worries. Craig’s proposal offers him a way of side-stepping proposed counterexamples that do not
directly play into the conditions he has set for the explication. So, if
one is to accurately assess Craig’s proposal it would seem that one has
to change her epistemic venue and approach the question of whether
Craig has given an adequate explication qua explication. Let us now
turn to this question.

4. The Explication of ‘Good Informant’
Craig maintains that his explication is akin to Carnap’s method of explication (or rational reconstruction). ‘Explication’, as Carnap used
the term, described a process of revising a concept (1950, pp. 3–8).3 In
an explication, philosophers take a concept that is too vague (the concept to be revised or the “explicandum”) and replace it by a more precise concept (the new concept that replaces the original or the “explicatum”). The latter concept is to be less vague that the original, but it
is not to be perfectly precise. The explicatum is intended to be an improvement over the previous concept, but it is not intended to suitable
in all subsequent circumstances. Take, for instance, the concept of
salt. People may first have this concept in mind when discussing seasonings, but this concept will not do for chemists. For chemists, salt
will be replaced by the concept sodium chloride (NaCl). This latter
concept is much more precise than the original. Now, obviously the
concept of sodium chloride will not work for someone interested in
physical chemistry, so it may at some time be replaced by a more precise concept.
Carnap maintained there are four factors in judging an explication
to be adequate. First, the explicatum needs to be similar to or, as
Hanna puts it, “agrees with” the explicandum (1968, p. 36). PhilosoPrincipia 8 (2), Florianópolis, December 2004, pp. 193–211.
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phers cannot treat the correspondence between the two concepts as a
mere coincidence. There needs to be some similarity between the two
to warrant the explication. Second, the explicatum needs to be as exact as possible. That is, the characterization of the explicatum needs to
be given in as exact a form as possible so it can be easily integrated
into a well-connected system of already accepted concepts. Third, the
explicatum needs to be fruitful. The revised concept is more fruitful
the more it can be brought into connection with other concepts on the
basis of observed facts. The more it can be used in the formation of
laws governing the concepts in questions. And, finally, the explicatum
needs to be as simple as possible. The simplicity of a concept is measured by the simplicity of the form of its definition and the simplicity of
the forms of the laws that connect it with other concepts. Simplicity,
as Carnap notes, is only of secondary concern. The factor’s importance
only comes into play when there is a choice between numerous concepts which seem to satisfy the other factors the same. When the explicatum meets these four conditions, it is said to be adequate.
What is important to recognize is that an explication is not intending to give necessary and sufficient conditions. Since explication is a
matter of revising, the question of whether it is true is misleading. The
judgment that an explicatum is similar to the explicandum may be
judged true or false to a certain degree. As well it may be judged true or
false whether the explicatum is exact, fruitful, or simple to a certain
degree. The reason I say “to a certain degree” is that the judgment is a
matter of whether the explicatum is similar, exact, fruitful, or simple
enough to be adequate. Since there is this inherent vagueness even
within the explicatum, an explication cannot result in necessary and
sufficient conditions.
One thing to note is that unlike conceptual analysis, our concepts
cannot be incorrect in the sense of failing to correspond to a mindindependent reality. It is possible for our concepts to be incorrect in
that they are confused, but this is not the same as in conceptual analysis. The goal of the analysis is not to provide us with a correct account
or with our shared, common theory; rather it is to eliminate confusion.4
Craig alters this method by maintaining that he is interested in a
practical, rather than theoretical explication. He intends to throw “light
Principia 8 (2), Florianópolis, December 2004, pp. 193–211.
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on the nature and origins of present practice” (1990, p. 8). He intends
to “illuminate” the vague concept we already have by showing that a
concept with the hypothesized role would be sufficiently close to the
original that it itself exhibits (1990, p. 2). Those hypothesized
characteristics are based in what the concept does for us, the value it
has for us, what its role in our life is, etc. So, while Craig’s proposal
owes a deep debt to Carnap’s method, it is slightly altered for his own
practical purposes.
So, the question is whether the standards by which to assess Craig’s
proposal meet the criteria for an adequate explication?5 As articulated
earlier, the concept of ‘knowledge’, according to Craig, is that of the
objectivised concept of a ‘good informant’. Does this meet the four
features of similarity, exactness, fruitfulness, and simplicity? Similarity,
for Carnap, is a matter of the explicatum being able to be substituted
for the explicandum in most cases where it has been used (Carnap
1962, p. 7). It would seem to be the case that a ‘good informant’ can
be used in place of ‘knower’ in most cases. In practical situations,
which Craig is interested in, to replace the concept of a knower with
that of a good informant would yield the same pragmatic results. It is
important to note that Carnap does not demand “close similarity”
(1962, p. 7). It is allowed that there are considerable differences. So, if
one is looking for information as to whether p, it would be pragmatic
to look for a good informant who could inform you as to whether p.
To meet the exactness requirement a good informant would have
to have its rules of use be given in an exact as way as possible so as to
be able to be introduce into our already well-connected epistemic system.6 The question here is what already established epistemic concepts
we are trying to introduce the explicatum into. If we say that we are
attempting to introduce ‘good informant’ into our traditional, justifiedtrue-belief epistemic system, then Craig’s proposal fails here. Since
Craig has not given explicit rules as to when an informant has a justified true belief nor any notion of the evidential relations the informant
has, it is not clear that Craig’s proposal meets this feature of explication. In fact he disavows the possibility of many of the traditional
probability, evidential, or other justificatory concepts that play into
our conception of knowledge. Essentially, Craig has rejected the alPrincipia 8 (2), Florianópolis, December 2004, pp. 193–211.
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ready established epistemic system at the outset, so it is not clear that
he can maintain that the rules governing the use of ‘good informant’
have been given in as exact a way as possible. One could say that if we
look merely at our everyday epistemic situation, the rules governing
‘good informants’ can be introduced in a fairly exact way, but surely
even in our everyday epistemic situation there will be some evidential
notions. And if there are some notions of evidential or other justificatory concepts in our everyday epistemic situation, then Craig’s proposal has not satisfied this feature of the explication.
The fruitfulness requirement maintains the concept is useful for the
formation of many universal statements (Carnap 1962, p. 7). Through
the objectivisation of the concept, Craig has proposed that we now
have it such that the standards for recommending a good informant
are the same for everyone even without knowing what one’s purposes
are for acquiring the information. So, it would seem that due to the
objectivisation of the concept, we can develop various epistemic
“laws” to governing our everyday epistemic practices. In this way,
Craig’s proposal does meet the fruitfulness requirement.
Lastly, simplicity is supposed to be a matter of the explicatum being
simple in light of the first three requirements. I take it that by not invoking traditional epistemic notions a ‘good informant’ is simple in its
form. Craig’s three requirements of a good informant (that one be
likely enough in the context to be right about p, that there are open
channels of communication, and that there is some detectable property) do not invoke any unnecessary requirements outside of our everyday epistemic needs. So, it would seem prima facie simple. Yet, a
question does arise. How exactly do we specify the “detectable property”? Craig’s move is to derive the recognizability requirement from
the objectivisation of the concept of a good informant. It seems that
we get the ability to detect from the recommendations of others. But
does this meet the simplicity requirement? It is not clear. Craig does a
lot of epistemic work in order to get to the objectivised concept of a
good informant. Furthermore, given that we are restricting ourselves
to everyday epistemic situations, it seems prima facie problematic to
say that the objectivised concept of a good informant is simple in light
of similarity and exactness requirements. I do not take it as a settled
matter as to whether Craig can cash out the recognizability requirePrincipia 8 (2), Florianópolis, December 2004, pp. 193–211.
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ment in a way in which to satisfy the simplicity requirement, but it
would seem problematic at the outset.

5. Concluding Remarks
Craig’s proposal does not fall victim to many of the various worries
that some have had about it. I believe that if we look deeper at Craig’s
account, many of the worries fall by the wayside. Yet, a number of
questions arise if we assess the proposal on its own terms – as an adequate explication of knowledge. If we consider Craig’s proposal in light
of the criteria for an adequate explication it is not clear that his proposal is ultimately satisfying. While I do believe that he can account
for the similarity and fruitfulness features, I am less convinced that he
can account for the exactness and simplicity requirements. This is not
to say that there are no ways of doing this while still remaining faithful
to Craig’s goals. I am sympathetic to both Craig’s goals and methods,
but I believe that more needs to be given in the way of fitting the concept of a good informant into our everyday epistemic situation which
(very likely) includes some traditional justificatory concepts.7
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Resumo
Edward Craig propôs que a epistemologia deveria afastar a análise conceitual tradicional em favor do que ele denomina “síntese conceitual.” Ele propõe que não comecemos por encontrar condições necessárias e suficientes
que correspondam a nossas intuições, e que, ao contrário, comecemos com
as considerações sobre o que o conceito de conhecimento faz por nós. Neste
artigo, vou explorar um aspecto da proposta de Craig – o bom informante.
É esse aspecto que é central no método epistêmico de Craig, e talvez o mais
problemático. Vou avaliar esse conceito, primeiro, articulando três preocupações iniciais que alguns tiveram sobre o conceito, e então mostrando como
cada uma dessas preocupações iniciais pode ser acalmadas ao examinarmos
com mais profundidade os aspectos daquilo que é a proposta de Craig. Então, avalio a proposta de Craig em seus próprios termos, tendo em conta o
conceito de bom informante à luz dos critérios para uma boa explicação. O
que vou mostrar é que, enquanto há muito com o que se possa concordar na
proposta de Craig, há algumas questões deixadas em aberto, que precisam
ser resolvidas para podermos dizer que uma explicação adequada foi alcançada.
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Notes
1

I will not at this time go through Craig’s arguments for rejecting traditional
conceptual analysis as the appropriate methodology for epistemology. The
general line of reasoning as to why he eschews traditional conceptual analysis
will be discussed in a later section.
2
These worries are taken from Dancy (1992) and Feldman (1997).
3
I should note that there are some who disagree with an explication being a
matter of revising a concept. W. V. O. Quine (1960, § 53) and Joseph Hanna
(1968, p. 30) agree that it is better to speak of explicating linguistic terms or,
as Quine calls them, “defective nouns.” The reason for this is that, as they see
it, concepts are mysterious and it is better to avoid them when it is possible to
make the same point referring only to predicates. I leave this for the time being an open question and will continue to speak of explicating concepts since
I am following Carnap’s method primarily and it is he that speaks of explicating concepts.
4
We can see this by looking at an example such as the Gettier case. When
philosophers ask “What is the nature of knowledge?” on this view, they are
not searching for a better understanding of the concept as in the standard
conceptual analysis. They are looking to replace our current, confused, imprecise concept with a concept that is less confused and more precise. So, the
traditional account of knowledge is meant as an explication in that it is supposed to be a replacement for our confused concept of knowledge. The Gettier case, then, is intended to show that there is an important criterion that is
not being met by our current explication of knowledge being justified true
belief. Since an adequate explication must overlap with the initial concept,
our intuition that Smith does not know is good evidence that the proposed
explication does not overlap enough with our initial concept.
5
I am taking it that Carnap’s four factors are sufficient to initially assess
whether Craig has given an adequate explication.
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Carnap maintains that it be introduced into a well-connected system of scientific concepts, but I feel that we do not have to demand this latter part of
Craig’s proposal. Since Craig is not proposing to introduce the concept into a
scientific system, but rather our everyday epistemic situation, we need not
demand that a ‘good informant’ be exact in a scientific sense.
7
I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful and
exceptionally helpful comments.
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